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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Easley argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied
her due process and equal protection when it denied her Motion to Augment the record
on appeal with transcripts of the admit/deny hearing, held on September 17, 2007, the
disposition hearing, held on October 29, 2007, and the rider review hearing, held on
February 22, 2011. Ms. Easley argues that the requested transcripts are necessary for
her appeal because the district court could utilize its own memory of the prior
proceedings when it executed her sentence after relinquishing jurisdiction. Based on
the new standard of review articulated in State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App.
2012), the State argues that the transcripts at are issue are not relevant because the
district court never referenced those proceedings when it revoked probation and
executed Ms. Easley's sentence.
Ms. Easley argues that the requested transcripts are relevant because a district
court can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings when it makes a sentencing
decision. In fact, the Idaho Court of Appeals presumes that a district court will rely on
its own memory of the prior proceedings when making a sentencing determination after
a period of probation. Based on that presumption, the Idaho' Court of Appeals has held
that it reviews the entire record before the district court, which includes events which
occurred before and after sentencing.

It follows that transcripts of the requested

hearing are necessary in order for an Idaho appellate court to conduct this review.
Since Idaho appellate courts conduct an independent review of the entire record when
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determining whether a district court abused its discretion in regard to a sentencing
determination, what was specifically presented to the district court at the probation
violation disposition hearing does not define the scope of review concerning the
sentencing issue. The only questions are: whether the information at issue was before
the district court at any of the prior hearings, and whether that information is relevant to
the sentencing issues on appeal.
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Easley also argued that the Twin Falls County
practice which affords the prosecuting attorney the ability to veto a defendant's
application to mental health court violates the separation of powers doctrine contained
in Article II, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. Ms. Easley specifically argues that the
decision to place her in the mental health court program occurred after the entry of
judgment and, therefore, constitutes a probationary decision which is inherently judicial
in nature and that decision is statutorily delegated to the district court pursuant to I.C. §
19-2601.

In response, the State cites to cases from Oregon and Washington which

deal with a prosecutor's ability to control admission into drug courts before the entry of
judgment. The cases relied on by the State do not address Ms. Easley's arguments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Easley's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Easley due process and equal protection
when it denied her Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the prosecutor to prevent
a district court from considering the placement of a defendant into mental health
court violate Idaho's separation of powers doctrine?

3.

Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the prosecutor to prevent
a district court from considering a defendant as a candidate for mental health
court violate the constitutional requirement that all courts of the same class have
uniform judicial powers, procedures, and practices?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Easley's
probation?1

5.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to further reduce
Ms. Easley's sentences sua sponte upon revoking probation?

1

Ms. Easley will only address issues I and II in this brief.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Easley Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary Transcripts

A.

Introduction
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making

sentencing decisions.

Due to this broad range of information considered, Idaho

appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive
appellate record because they conduct an independent review of the entire record
before the district court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in
regard to a sentencing determination. In other words, the question on appeal generally
does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered.

Instead, the

central question is whether the record before the district court supports its sentencing
determination.
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of
the issue. In some instances, the Court of Appeals has refused to address the merits of
issues on appeal due to the appellants' failure to provide transcripts of hearings which
were never discussed by the district court and occurred years before the disposition of
the issue on appeal.
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B.

The New Standard Of Review Articulated in Morgan Is Inapposite As It Did Not
Alter The Standard Of Review Applicable When An Appellant Challenges The
Length Of A Sentence Which Is Executed After The Revocation Of Probation
In reliance on the new standard of review articulated in Morgan, the State argues

that the requested transcripts are not necessary for this appeal. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.5-9.)

Contrary to the State's position, the Morgan standard of review is only

applicable to the question of whether probation should be revoked, not to the question
of what is an appropriate sentence. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26 (Ct. App. 2009),
made it clear what standard of review is applicable when the question on appeal is
whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

Morgan is inapposite, as

Ms. Easley is challenging the length of her sentence on appeal.
The Court of Appeals' standard of review which is relevant to the length of a
sentence which is executed following the revocation of probation was articulated in
Hanington. In that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals resolved an ongoing dispute about

the proper standard of review in probation revocation cases.

Id. at 27.

Relying on

State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2008), and State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho

392 (Ct. App. 1992), the State sought to limit review to only facts that had arisen
between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation proceedings.
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Essentially, the State's position would have eliminated any

need for appellate courts to review the change of plea hearing transcript, the sentencing
transcript, and the presentence report because all of that information would have been
available to the district court prior to the original sentencing hearing. See id. Hanington
argued that the proper standard of review should include a review of "all facts existing
both at the time of the original sentence and at the time the sentence is ordered into
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execution," relying on the standard established in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053,
1055-"1056 (Ct. App. 1989). Id. at 27. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hanington and

held:
The State has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review
too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited
solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and
the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we
will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation.

Id.
The Hanington Court made it clear that when determining what sentence to
execute, the appellate court would review the entire record, including the factors at the
original sentencing hearing through the probation revocation before the court on appeal.
The rationale behind this clarification comports with the rationale in the holding from
State v. Adams, the decision that explained why the appellate courts should look to the

entire record when reviewing the executed sentence:
[Wlhen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
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hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56 (emphasis added).

As such, when an appellant

challenges the length of his/her sentence, the applicable standard of review requires an
independent and comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well
as the events which occurred during, the disposition of the matter at issue. The basis
for this standard of review is that the judge "naturally and quite properly remembers the
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision."

Id.

Based on that presumption, the Court of Appeals held that, "When reviewing that
decision, we should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not hold
that the district court must expressly reference the prejudgment events in order for this
standard of review to become applicable.

To the contrary, the Court of Appeals

presumed the judge will automatically consider the prejudgment events when
determining whether to execute or reduce a sentence.
Additionally, the State implicitly asserts that Ms. Easley should file a renewed
motion to augment the record with the Court of Appeals in the event this case is
assigned to the Court of Appeals.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.)

This assertion is

without merit because the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed with the
Idaho Supreme Court. For example, Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states as follows:
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall be
no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or
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other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the
Supreme Court
(emphasis added).

Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to

augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.A.R. 30 follow:
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Ms. Easley is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to an
appeal to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. "Idaho Appellate Rule 110
expressly prohibits such filings. Therefore, the State's contention that Ms. Easley could
file a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to the
Idaho Appellate Rules.
In sum, the Morgan Opinion is inapposite as it only dealt with an appeal
challenging the district court's decision to revoke probation. Hanington still controls the
applicable standard of review when a sentence is challenged on appeal.

As such, the

requested transcripts are relevant to the sentencing issue raised on appeal because
Idaho Appellate Courts will presume that the district court relied on its memory of the
prior proceedings when it executed Ms. Easley's sentence. As such, the district court
need not have referenced the prior proceedings in order for the transcripts of those
proceedings to be deemed relevant to Ms. Easley's sentencing issue.
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II.
The Fifth Judicial District's Practice, Which Allows The Prosecutor To Prevent The
District Court From Considering A Defendant As A Candidate For Mental Health Court,
Violates Idaho's Separation Of Powers Doctrine
Ms. Easley's separation of powers argument hinges on the fact that her request
for admittance into mental health court was made after the entry of judgment. In her
Appellant's Brief, and in reliance on Bil/is v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990),
Ms. Easley drew the distinction between the prosecutor's pre-judgment executive
decision to pursue or dismiss charges and a district court's judicial post-judgment
decision to set the terms of probation. In response to this argument, the State primarily
relies on two cases-both of which address only the prosecutor's pre-judgment executive
decision to pursue or dismiss charges. (Respondent's Brief, pp12-13.) Those cases,
deal with drug court programs which stop the criminal proceedings prior to the entry of
judgment and, in the event if the defendant complies with treatment, the criminal cases
are dismissed. As such, the State's cases do not address Ms. Easley's argument on
appeal.
The State initially relies on State v. Graves, 648 P.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1982), for the
proposition that "the power to decide whether to divert a defendant for drug treatment is
no more intrusive on the judicial branch than the power to decide whether to take any
action against the defendant at all . . . . " (Respondent's Brief, p.12.)

The Graves

Opinion is inapposite as that case was dealing with a pre-judgment diversionary
program governed by the following statute:
When the results of the evaluation obtained under ORS 430.460 or
430.465 indicate that the defendant is a drug-dependent person within the
meaning of ORS 430.450 to 430.555, and the results of the evaluation
indicate that such person may benefit in a substantial manner from
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treatment for drug dependence, the prosecutor, with the concurrence of
the court, may direct the defendant to receive treatment as a contingent
alternative to prosecution. If defendant refuses treatment, criminal
proceedings shall be resumed.
O.R.S. 430.485.

Oregon's Revised Statute 430.485 enables a diversionary program

that allows a defendant to avoid prosecution if s/he qualifies for the program and both
the prosecutor and the court agree as to that outcome. In the event the defendant is
successful in the program, the charges are then dismissed by the prosecutor. In the
event the defendant refuses treatment, then the "criminal proceedings shall be
resumed."

This is an example of a diversionary program where the prosecuting

attorney is exercising the executive power of determining which cases should be
brought to trial. The Graves Opinion provides no guidance in this case because it dealt
with a pre-judgment diversionary program, not a post-judgment sentencing alternative.
The second case relied on by the State is State v. Diluzo, 90 P.3d 1141 (Ct. App.
2004). The State relies on this case for the proposition that "the practice of allowing the
prosecutor to make the initial determinations of drug court eligibility [is not] an
unconstitutional delegation of power to the prosecutor" because the prosecutor is in a
better position to asses a defendant's eligibility for such a program.

(Respondent's

Brief, pp.12-13.)
Neither the Diluzo Opinion nor the applicable statute authorizing the creation of
drug courts in Washington State, R.C.W. 2.28.170, indicate whether drug court
participation occurs before or after sentencing. However, in ruling on the separation of
powers argument in that case, the third division of the Washington Court of Appeals
noted that the Supreme Court of Washington had previously rejected a prosecutorial
veto power in the context of the State's "deferred prosecution" sentencing alternative
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because judges in Washington control "traditional choices of imprisonment, fine, and
post-conviction probation." Id. at 1145. It appears that the Diluzo Court was dealing
with a pre-judgment drug court program.

Moreover, Diluzo supports Ms. Easley's

position that the ability to determine the terms of probation is traditionally a judicial
decision.
Additionally, it appears from other Washington cases that the Washington drug
court program is ordered prior to the entry of judgment. For example, in State v. Drum,
225 P.3d 237, 239 (2010), the defendant was required to enter a contract to participate
in drug court. One of the terms of that contract allowed the defendant to withdraw from
the program and "the defendant will assume prosecution under the pending charge(s)
as if the contract had never been agreed to." Id. The contract also stated that in the
event the defendant was terminated form drug court the "defendant further agrees and

stipulates that the facts presented [in the drug court contract] are sufficient to find the
defendant guilty of the pending charge(s)."

Id. (original emphasis).

As such, the

reasonable inference which can be drawn from the Drum case is that the drug court
program in Washington is a pre-judgment program. It follows that any arguments based
on the Washington drug court program do not address Ms. Easley's appellate claim.
As a final note, the State relies on cases from Oklahoma and Louisiana for
further support of its argument. However, the Oklahoma case, Woodard v. Morrissey,
991 P.2d 1042 (Ok. App. 1999), dealt with a pre-sentencing drug court program and no
separation of powers violation was found because it was part of the plea negotiations.
Moreover, Oklahoma has a specific statute, Okla. Stat. 22 § 471.8, which governors the
use of drug courts in the context of their use as a term of probation. That statute was
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not analyzed in the Woodard Opinion. In the Louisiana case, State v. Taylor, 769 SO.2d
535 (La. 2000), the Supreme Court of Louisiana did not decide the issue of a
prosecutorial control over admission into a drug court on the basis of separation of
powers. Instead, it merely concluded that the applicable Louisiana statute provided for
prosecutorial control over admission into a drug court program. However, there were
two dissenting opinions, one of which dissented partially on the basis of a separation of
powers violation. Id. at 540-543. There was also a concurring opinion which noted that
the statue at issue did not violate the State's separation powers doctrine because it
dealt with the "pre-trial initiation of the eligibility process (at which time the district
attorney can still reduce or dismiss the charge) [which is] a prosecutorial function." Id.
at 539. The concurrence also concluded that the statute in the Tay/or case is "vastly"
different from a statute deemed to violate the State's separation of powers doctrine in a
prior opinion,2 because the

unconstitutional statue "involved

a post-conviction

sentencing procedure, a function reserved exclusively to the judicial branch." Id. at 539540.
In sum, Ms. Easley argues that in Idaho the decision to allow her to participate in
a mental health court as a term of her probation was inherently judicial, and was
statutorily delegated to the district court pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601. The State does not
address Ms. Easley's statutory argument and, instead, relies on out of state cases
which do not directly address the distinction between pre-judgment and post-judgment
sentencing alternatives.

2

See State v. LeCompte, 406 SO.2d 1300 (La.1981).
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Easley respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Ms. Easley respectfully
requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions to consider placement into
the Fifth Judicial District's mental health court.

Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully

requests that this Court remand this case with instructions to place her on probation.
Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of the
indeterminate portion of her sentences. Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully requests
that this Court reduce the length of her sentences as it deems appropriate.

DATED this

4th

day of April, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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